Constitutional Law--Supreme Court Is Undecided on Parental Notification Requirement for Minor\u27s Abortion, Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979) by McArthur, John R.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 31 Issue 3 Article 12 
1980 
Constitutional Law--Supreme Court Is Undecided on Parental 
Notification Requirement for Minor's Abortion, Bellotti v. Baird, 99 
S. Ct. 3035 (1979) 
John R. McArthur 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
McArthur, John R. (1980) "Constitutional Law--Supreme Court Is Undecided on Parental Notification 
Requirement for Minor's Abortion, Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979)," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 
31 : Iss. 3 , Article 12. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss3/12 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -SUPREME COURT IS UNDECIDED ON
PARENTAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT FOR MINOR'S ABORTION,
Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Bellotti v. Baird,' the United States Supreme Court held
that a Massachusetts statute that required either parental or
judicial consent before a pregnant minor could obtain an abortion
unconstitutionally infringed on the minor's right to privacy. In an
opinion written by Justice Powell, four Justices concluded that
the statute's parental notification provision also was unconstitu-
tional.' In considering this notification issue, the Court analyzed
the privacy rights of the minor vis-a-vis her parents and the state,
and affirmed the principle that the constitutional rights of a
minor are not equal to those of an adult.3
A woman's right to privacy in relation to her abortion deci-
sion was first recognized in Roe v. Wade,4 in which the Supreme
Court held that a state statute that prohibited a woman from
obtaining an abortion unconstitutionally infringed on her right to
privacy. The Court concluded that a state could not prohibit an
abortion in the first trimester, although some state interests
would justify burdening a woman's privacy right in the later
stages of pregnancy.' In reaching this decision, the Court ex-
pressly reserved judgment on the rights of a pregnant minor.'
Three years later, however, in the widely criticized 7 case of
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth," the Court struck down a Mis-
1. 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979).
2. Id. at 3052.
3. Id. at 3043.
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. Id. at 163.
6. Id. at 165 n.67.
7. See, e.g., Note, Parental Consent Abortion Statutes: The Limits of State Power,
52 IND. L.J. 837 (1977); Note, Third Party Consent to Abortions Before and After Dan-
forth: A Theoretical Analysis, 15 J. FAm. L. 508 (1977); Note, Abortion Statutes After
Danforth: An Examination, 15 J. FAM. L. 537 (1977); Note, The Illinois Abortion Parental
Consent Act of 1977: A Far Cry from Permissible Consultation, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC & PROC.
135 (1978); Comment, Abortion: An Unresolved Issue - Are Parental Consent Statutes
Unconstitutional?, 55 NEB. L. lav. 256 (1976); Comment, Constitutional Law: Elimina-
tion of Spousal and Parental Consent Requirements for Abortion, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 462
(1977); 31 ARK. L. REv. 122 (1977); 7 Cum. L. Rav. 539 (1977); 8 Tax. TECH. L. Rav. 394
(1976).
8. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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souri parental consent statute because it gave the parent an
"absolute veto" over the abortion decision of the pregnant minor
in the first trimester.' Drawing on the principles established in
Roe and Danforth, the Court in Bellotti attempted to further
define the constitutional privacy rights of a minor in the conteit
of the abortion decision.'"
In Bellotti plaintiffs brought suit in the Massachusetts fed-
eral district court to enjoin enforcement of section 12S of the
Massachusetts general abortion statute" and to challenge its con-
stitutionality on fourteenth amendment due process and equal
protection grounds.2
The district court declared section 12S unconstitutional on
the ground that the restrictions it imposed on the privacy rights
of minors could not be justified, either by the state interests as-
9. Id. at 74. A number of lower courts have declared parental consent statutes uncon-
stitutional based on Danforth. Wolfe v. Schoering, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976); Wynn v.
Scott, 448 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Floyd v. Anders, 440 F. Supp. 535 (D.S.C. 1977);
Hoe v. Brown, 446 F. Supp. 329 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's
Servs. v. Bowen, 421 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
10. The scope of a minor's right to privacy in the abortion context depends not
only upon an assessment of the minor's as yet unsettled constitutional status,
but also upon the conflicts of this status with the constitutional rights of parents
to supervise the upbringing of their children and the power of the state to
regulate matters of public health and safety.
Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 VA.
L. REv. 305, 306 (1974).
11. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West Supp. 1979) provides in part:
If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married, the consent
of both the mother and her parents is required. If one or both of the mother's
parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by order of a judge of the
superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary.
Such a hearing will not require the appointment of a guardian for the mother.
If one of the parents has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the
remaining parent is sufficient. If both parents have died or have deserted their
family, consent of the mother's guardian or other person having duties similar
to a guardian, or any person who had assumed the care and custody of the
mother is sufficient. The commissioner of public health shall prescribe a written
form for such consent. Such form shall be signed by proper person or persons
and given to the physician performing the abortion who shall maintain it in his
permanent files.
This statute was enacted in 1974, as § 12P of chapter 112. Amendments in 1977 changed
the numbering of the section but not the substance. Throughout the text and footnotes,
this Comment refers to the statute by its current designation, § 12S. Bracketed references
to § 12S in quotations indicate that the original reference to § 12P has been changed for
consistency and to avoid confusion.
Section 12T of the current statute provides for imprisonment as punishment for
violation of § 12S.
12. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 12
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss3/12
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REWEW [Vol. 31
serted or by the recognized rights of parents to raise their
children.'3 Defendants appealed directly to the Supreme Court."
The Supreme Court vacated the district court's decisioli and
stated that the district court should have abstained and certified
questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts con-
cerning the meaning of the statute.'"
After questions were certified to and answered by the Massa-
chusetts court, 6 the district court again found section 12S uncon-
13. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847, 854-57 (D. Mass. 1975).
14. Before its repeal by Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976), 28 U.S.C. §
2281 authorized the convening of a three-judge court to determine suits to enjoin enforce-
ment of allegedly unconstitutional state statutes. Direct appeal of these suits to the
Supreme Court was available under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976).
15. 428 U.S. at 151-52. The Court concluded that the procedure for certifying ques.
tions to the state court for an authoritative interpretation was authorized under the
Massachusetts rules of court. See MAss. SuP. JUD. CT. R. 3:21.
16. The nine questions certified by the district court are:
1. What standards, if any, does the statute establish for a parent to apply
when considering whether or not to grant consent?
(a) Is the parent to consider exclusively. . .'what will serve the child's
best interests'?
(b) If the parent is not limited to considering exclusively the minor's
best interests, can the parent take into consideration the 'long-term con-
sequences to the family and her parents' marriage relationship'?
(c) Other?
2. What standard or standards is the superior court to apply?
(a) Is the superior court to disregard all parental objections that are not
based exclusively on what would serve the minor's best interests?
(b) If the superior court finds that the minor is capable, and has, in fact,
made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have an
abortion, may the court refuse its consent based on a finding that a
parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better one?
(c) Other?
3. Does the Massachusetts law permit a minor (a) capable of giving in-
formed consent, or (b) incapable of giving informed consent, to obtain a court
order without parental consultation?
4. If the court answers any of question 3 in the affirmative, may the
superior court, for good cause shown, enter an order authorizing an abortion,
(a) without prior notification to the parents, and (b) without subsequent noti-
fication?
5. Will the Supreme Judicial Court prescribe a set of procedures to
implement c. 112, [§ 12S] which will expedite the application, hearing, and
decision phases of the superior court proceeding provided thereunder? Appeal?
6. To what degree do the standards and procedures set forth in c. 112
§ 12F (Stat. 1975, c. 564), authorizing minors to give consent to medical and
dental care in specific circumstances, parallel the grounds and procedures for
showing good cause under c. 112, [§ 12S]?
7. May a minor, upon a showing of indigency, have court appointed
counsel?
8. Is it a defense to his criminal prosecution if a physician performs an
abortion solely with the minor's own, valid, consent, that he reasonably, and
in good faith, though eironeously, believed that she was eighteen or more
3
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stitutional.Y1 This decision was based on three grounds: (1) paren-
tal notice could not be required in cases in which a superior court
judge could decide that the minor was mature enough to make
her own decision, or that an abortion was in her best interests;
(2) an absolute third-party veto over the decision of a mature
minor is unconstitutional under Danforth; and (3) the statute
contained "formal overbreadth" and was not limited to legiti-
mate state interests.18
II. THE DIVIDED SUPREME COURT DECISION
On appeal to the Supreme Court for the second time, eight
Justices agreed that the statute, as construed by the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court, was unconstitutional. The major-
ity split, however, on the basis for this conclusion. In a short
opinion written by Justice Stevens, four Justices concluded that
section 12S required every minor, no matter how mature, to ob-
tain consent, either from her parents, or from a superior court
judge.'" This Massachusetts statute, like the Missouri statute
struck down in Danforth, subjected the minor's decision to an
absolute third-party veto.20 These Justices rested their opinion
squarely on Danforth alone, since that case held that "the State
does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party
an absolute, and possibly arbitrary veto over the decision of the
physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy,
regardless of the reason for withholding consent."'
In a separate opinion written by Justice Powell, four Justices
found pertinent distinctions between issues raised by the Massa-
chusetts statute and those decided in Danforth. These Justices
agreed with the Stevens plurality that section 12S was unconsti-
years old or had been married?
9. Will the Court make any other comments about the statute which, in
its opinion, might assist us in determining whether it infringes the United
States Constitution?
Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 360 N.E.2d 288, 292-302 (1977) (questions
appear in footnotes)(citations omitted). For the major requirements of the statute, as
construed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, see notes 35-36 and accompany-
ing text infra.
17. Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997 (D. Mass. 1978).
18. Id. at 1000-05.
19. 99 S. Ct. at 3053-54.
20. Id.
21. Id. (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74).
1980]
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tutional because it permitted a court to withhold authorization
for an abortion from a minor who is mature and capable of mak-
ing the decision independently." Additionally, however, the Pow-
ell plurality found that section 12S imposed an impermissible
burden on the privacy rights of a minor because it required paren-
tal notification and consultation before the minor could obtain an
independent judicial determination whether she was mature
enough to make her own decision, or whether an abortion would
be in her best interests.2 This requirement of parental consulta-
tion was precisely the issue that fragmented the Court.
The Missouri statute challenged in Danforth required, in all
cases, that a pregnant minor obtain the consent of her parents as
a prerequisite to a legal abortion during the first trimester.24 The
Massachusetts statute at issue in Bellotti had a parental consent
requirement, but it alternatively authorized a circuit judge to
allow the minor to have an abortion without her parents' consent
"for good cause shown." As construed by the Massachusetts
court, section 12S required every minor seeking an abortion to
first attempt to obtain the consent of her parents, unless the
parents were unavailable, or unless an emergency existed.2 Both
parents, if available, had to receive notice of any judicial proceed-
ings brought by the minor under the statute. If such proceedings
were instituted, the judge could authorize the abortion only if
convinced that it would serve the minor's best interests. 2 Pre-
viously, the Court had observed that a notification provision
might present issues "fundamentally different from a statute that
creates a 'parental veto.' "128 Justice Stewart, in his concurring
opinion in Danforth, implied that a statute that required parental
consultation along with a provision for an accessible judicial hear-
ing, might be constitutional. 29 Several lower courts had made this
same observation."0
The Massachusetts statute, however, required either the con-
22. 99 S. Ct. at 3052.
23. Id.
24. 428 U.S. at 85.
25. See note 9 supra.
26. Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. at 749, 360 N.E.2d at 294.
27. Id. at 748, 360 N.E.2d at 293.
28. 428 U.S. at 145 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 52).
29. 428 U.S. at 90-91 (Stewart, J., concurring).
30. E.g., Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975); State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d
901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975).
[Vol. 31
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sent of the parents or the consent of a judge. Since both the
parents and the judge are "third parties" with respect to the
pregnant minor, the three Justices concurring with Justice Ste-
vens concluded that the statutory provisions amounted to an ab-
solute veto over the minor's abortion decision.3' Therefore, section
12S infringed upon the minor's privacy right to the same degree
as the Missouri statute that was declared unconstitutional in
Danforth.
Since section 12S was unconstitutional on this ground alone,
the Court had no need to consider whether a state could require
notification to or consultation with the parents before resort to a
judicial hearing. According to Justice Stevens, "[n]either
Danforth nor this case determines the constitutionality of a stat-
ute which does no more than require notice to the parents without
affording them or any other third party an absolute veto." 2 To
have held that every minor must be given an opportunity to seek
a judicial hearing without having to consult with her parents first
would have necessitated consideration of hypothetical issues not
before the Court.
3
1
Justice Powell apparently conceded that the Massachusetts
statute may not have placed the question of parental notification
squarely before the Court. He responded, however, to Justice
Stevens' charge that he was addressing hypothetical issues:
Apparently this is criticism of our attempt to provide some guid-
ance as to how a State constitutionally may provide for adult
involvement - either by parents or a state official such as a
judge - in the abortion decisions of minors. In view of the
importance of the issues raised, and the protracted litigation to
which these parties have been subjected, we think it would be
irresponsible simply to invalidate § 12S without stating our
views as to the controlling principles.-
On this rationale, the Powell plurality analyzed the constitution-
ality of the Massachusetts parental notification requirement.
31. 99 S. Ct. at 3053.
32. Id. n. 1.
33. Id. at 3055 n.4.
34. Id. at 3052 n.32. Justice Rehnquist, concurring with Powell, indicated he was also
concerned with providing guidance to the state legislatures and lower courts. He stated
that, "literally thousands of judges cannot be left with nothing more than the guidance
offered by a truly fragmented holding of this Court." Id. at 3053 (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring).
1980] 609
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Ill. ANALYSIS OF THE POWELL OPINION
Whether a minor has a constitutional right to privacy equal
to that of an adult is the fundamental constitutional issue upon
which the constitutionality of an abortion parental notification
requirement turns. Justice Powell considered this issue and con-
cluded that a minor's right is not equal to that of an adult.
35
Justice Powell did not employ the "compelling state interest" test
or the trimester approach used by the Court in Roe and to some
extent in Danforth, even though the Massachusetts parental noti-
fication and consent requirements were effective throughout
pregnancy. Rather, he concluded that for purposes of the consti-
tutionality of a parental notification provision, the stage of a
minor's pregnancy makes no difference." Finally, although Jus-
tice Powell affirmed the principle that unrestrained access to the
courts is necessary to protect the privacy rights of minors, he
failed to provide any guidelines for lower courts or to describe the
relevant factors that a judge should consider in order to protect
the minor's constitutional right.3"
A. Comparison of a Minor's and an Adult's Constitutional
Rights
In Danforth the Court said that although minors have consti-
tutional rights,38 the state has broader authority to regulate the
activities of children than of adults. 9 In the case of a pregnant
minor, the Court held that the state has the additional interests
of safeguarding the family unit and supporting parental authority
and control." These interests justify a greater intrusion into a
minor's right of privacy than into an adult's right of privacy.
They do not, however, justify complete veto power over the abor-
35. Id. at 3043.
36. Id. at 3052 n.31.
37. See notes 68-71 and accompanying text infra.
38. 428 U.S. at 74 (citing Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975)(right against being put
in jeopardy twice for the same offense); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (right against
denial of public education without due process of law); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969)(first amendment freedom of expression); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967)(right to the essentials of procedural due process in criminal proceedings - ade-
quate notice, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, confrontation of wit-
nesses)).
39. 428 U.S. at 74-75 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638-39 (1968);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169 (1944)).
40. 428 U.S. at 75.
[Vol. 31
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tion decision of those minors who are mature enough to make an
informed decision on their own.4'
In order to rule on the parental notification requirement,
Justice Powell re-examined the quality of a minor's right to pri-
vacy and the interests the state must assert in order to have a
constitutional justification for infringing upon that right. The
precedent for use of this type of constitutional analysis had been
set by the Court in abortion cases before Bellotti. Roe v. Wade
held that the state must assert a "compelling state interest" in
order to infringe upon the privacy right of a pregnant adult
woman. 2 In Danforth the Court implied that a "significant" state
interest was required in the case of a minor; Justice Blackmun,
writing for the majority, phrased the issue as "whether there is
any significant state interest in conditioning an abortion on the
consent of a parent or person in loco parentis."3
In Roe the Court seemed to use the term "significant" state
interest synonymously with "compelling" state interest.44 At
least one Justice has stated that in applying these tests the
Court had shown that the "significant" state interest test, "for
all practical purposes approaches the 'compelling state interest'
standard."45 Yet, there may be a difference. In Carey v. Popu-
lation Services International," a case involving the constitution-
ality of a statute prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to minors
under the age of sixteen, the Court also required the state to
show a "significant" state interest that justified the statutory
restriction on the privacy rights of minors.47 The plurality in
Carey stated that the significant state interest test as applied to
minors, "is apparently less rigorous than the 'compelling state
interest' test applied to restrictions on the privacy rights of
adults."48
Justice Powell, in Bellotti, did not attempt to clarify this
issue. He referred neither to the significant nor the compelling
state interest tests. At two points, however, he did indirectly refer
to the level of interest that the state asserted in the case. First,
he mentioned "the special interest of the State in encouraging an
41. Id. at 74-75.
42. 410 U.S. at 163-64.
43. 428 U.S. at 75.
44. 410 U.S. at 159.
45. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 706 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
46. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
47. Id. at 693 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75).
48. Id. at 693 n.15.
1980]
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unmarried pregnant minor to seek the advice of her parents in
making the important decision whether or not to bear a child.""'
Second, he recognized "an important state interest in encourag-
ing a family rather than a judicial resolution of a minor's abortion
decision.""0 One might reasonably infer from this language that
the Powell plurality believes the state need not assert a compel-
ling state interest in order to constitutionally infringe on a
minor's, as compared to an adult's, right to make her own abor-
tion decision. This conclusion seems to follow from the Court's
acceptance of the proposition that the constitutional rights of a
minor are not equal to those of an adult.5 '
Justice Powell fully discussed three reasons supporting the
conclusion that a minor's constitutional rights are not equal to
those of an adult: "the peculiar vulnerability of children, their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature man-
ner, and the importance of the parental role in child-rearing. '"52
The obvious implication of this analysis is that regulations affect-
ing a minor's privacy rights need not be subjected to strict scru-
tiny. Justice Powell does not explicitly come to this conclusion;
his holding, however, seems to have been based primarily on
practical considerations.
In most cases, according to Justice Powell, parents should
be involved and their consent should be necessary for a minor's
abortion decision.53 Yet, the point at which parental involvement
overburdens a minor's privacy right seems to be determined not
by the point at which the state's interests cease to be compelling
or significant, but rather by the point at which mandatory paren-
tal involvement becomes detrimental to the child.54 The practical
nature of Justice Powell's analysis is evident from his statement:
[M]any parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion,
and young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are
particuarly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct both
an abortion and their access to court. It would be unrealistic,
therefore, to assume that the mere existence of a legal right to
49. 99 S. Ct. at 3046.
50. Id. at 3050.
51. Id. at 3043-46.
52. Id. at 3043.
53. Id. at 3051.
54. Id. at 3050.
[Vol. 31
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seek relief in superior court provides an effective avenue of relief
for some of those who need it the most.55
Since mere knowledge that a minor is seeking an abortion
will, in some cases, cause parents to obstruct the minor's exercise
of her privacy right, Justice Powell concluded that a notification
requirement, just as effectively as a consent requirement, uncon-
stitutionally burdens that right. 6 The notification requirement is
unconstitutional, not because the state lacks a compelling or sig-
nificant state interest to justify it, but because, in some family
situations, it will have a detrimental effect on the health of a
pregnant minor and her ability to exercise her privacy right." The
possibility that parental obstruction may jeopardize the health of
the minor has been documented in other cases and commentary. '8
"She [the minor] may decide to bear the unwanted child, run
away, try to self-abort, or seek an illegal and possibly unsafe
abortion, as a result of the obstacles that a statute requiring
parental consultation puts upon her right to decide whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy. ' ' 9 The state interest in protect-
ing maternal health, as recognized in Roe v. Wade,6" may require
an effective judicial procedure for noninvolvement of a minor's
parents in those cases in which parental involvement could be
detrimental to the minor's health.
B. Parental Notification Unconstitutional at All Stages of
Pregnancy
The holding in Danforth was limited specifically to the first
trimester of pregnancy. Sensitive to the trimester approach used
by the Court in Roe v. Wade, a majority of the Court in Danforth
held that, "the State may not impose a blanket provision, such
as [the Missouri parental consent statute], requiring the consent
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See generally Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
58. Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1386 (7th Cir. 1978); Pilpel & Zuckerman,
Abortion and the Rights of Minors, in ABORTION, SOCmTY AND THE LAW 275, 296 (D.
Walbert & J. Butler eds. 1973); Note, Parental Consent Abortion Statutes: The Limits of
State Power, 52 IND. L.J. 837, 841-42 (1977); Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion and
the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 VA. L. REv. 305, 311 (1974).
59. Note, Parental Consent Abortion Statutes: The Limits of State Power, 52 IND.
L.J. 837, 842 (1977).
60. 410 U.S. at 163.
1980]
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of a parent or person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion
of an unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy." 6'
The Massachusetts statute challenged in Bellotti, however, did
not limit its parental consent or parental notification and judicial
consent requirements to the first trimester." The Stevens plural-
ity made no reference to this point. Justice Powell concluded that
it made no difference:
The propriety of parental involvement in a minor's abortion
decision does not diminish as the pregnancy progresses and le-
gitimate concerns for the pregnant minor's health increase ...
Thus, although a significant number of abortions within the
scope of § 12S might be performed during the later stages of
pregnancy, we do not believe a different analysis of the statute
is required for them. 3
This result may not be so simple. As stated in Roe v. Wade,
viability is the "compelling" point after which the state can pro-
scribe abortion in the interest of protecting a potential life.6" The
state may also require measures reasonably related to the preser-
vation and protection of maternal health after the first trimes-
ter.6 Hence, in the later stages of pregnancy, an adult woman's
privacy right competes with increasing state interests. Arguably
then, these state interests, in combination with the additional
state interest in the protection of minors,6 could reach the
"compelling" level and justify a parental consent or consultation
requirement. 7 Because an abortion is more dangerous for the
mother in the later stages of pregnancy, the state's interest in the
health of the pregnant minor and the parents' interest in the
health of their daughter could be recognized as "compelling" and
justify a parental consent or consultation requirement after the
first or second trimester. In addition, the parents may have an
interest in protecting the life of the fetus as a potential grand-
child. 8 If these parental and/or state interests were recognized as
61. 428 U.S. at 74.
62. See generally note 9 supra.
63. 99 S. Ct. at 3052 n.31.
64. 410 U.S. at 163.
65. Id.
66. See notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra.
67. But see Wolfe v. Schoering, 541 F.2d 523, 525 (6th Cir. 1976).
68. This interest is similar to, though not as strong as, the interest of a father in the
life of his unborn child, discussed in Danforth. 428 U.S. at 69; Id. at 93 (White, J.,
dissenting).
[Vol. 31
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compelling, those asserting such interests would still be required
to show furtherance of the interests by a parental consent or noti-
fication requirement. Since Justice Powell did not explicitly use
either the "compelling state interest" or "important state inter-
est" test, relevance of the trimester approach to parental notifica-
tion is left to speculation.
C. Guidance for the Lower Courts
Absent from either of the major Bellotti opinions or from the
Danforth opinion are any explicit guidelines for lower courts to
use in determining whether a minor is mature enough to make her
own decision or whether an abortion is in her best interests. Jus-
tice Powell mentioned that a court may take into account paren-
tal interest in the welfare of the child when a normal family
relationship exists. 9 Similarly, one commentator recently has
emphasized the importance of making an "assessment of the per-
sonal circumstances of each case." ' 0 The overall task of the judge,
however, is to determine if the minor is mature enough to make
an informed decision, or alternatively, if an abortion would be in
her best interests." It is this decision that will determine whether
the power of the state will be invoked to protect the privacy rights
of the minor.
One potential source of guidelines for determination of a
minor's maturity to make the .abortion decision is the guidelines
used by courts in states that recognize exceptions to the general
common-law requirement of parental consent to other medical
treatment for minors." Courts have considered such subjective
factors as the minor's mental capacity and emotional maturity,
and more objective factors, such as the minor's age, the serious-
ness of the treatment, the potential benefit of the treatment to
the minor, the parent-child relationship, and the opinion of the
physician involved. 3 Age is one factor to consider, but it alone is
69. 99 S. Ct. at 3051.
70. 26 DRAKE L. REV. 716 (1977).
71. 99 S. Ct. at 3052.
72. Wadlington, Minors and Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
115, 119 (1973); Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental
Consent, 60 VA. L. REV. 305, 310 (1974).
73. Wadlington, supra note 72, at 119; Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion and the
Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 VA. L. REv. 305, 310 (1974).
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not dispositive.74 An additional factor to consider is the recom-
mendations of social workers or other professional counselors in-
volved. In the case of a minor with hostile parents, the availabil-
ity of professional or para-professional counselling would seem to
be a primary consideration.
In cases such as Bellotti, in which a plurality of the Court
argued that unencumbered access to the courts is necessary to
protect a constitutional right, it would seem appropriate to out-
line for lower court judges the factors deemed important in the
judicial decision involved. Justice Powell stated that one of the
major purposes of his opinion was to provide guidance to state
legislatures in the area of parental consent for a minor's abortion.
An opportunity to provide guidelines to the judiciary was present
as well. When the decision to be made is one as sensitive as the
maturity of a minor to make a decision concerning the termina-
tion of her pregnancy, and whether parental involvement in the
decision is required, explicit guidelines to judges are especially
important.
IV. CONCLUSION
While Bellotti affirmed the Danforth decision that a state
cannot require parental consent for a minor's abortion, the case
did not decide whether a parental notification requirement un-
constitutionally infringes upon a minor's right to privacy. Four
Justices declined to rule on the issue. Four others concluded that
a state could not constitutionally impose such a requirement,
even though they had concluded that, in the abortion context at
least, the rights of a minor are not equal to those of an adult.
Unfortunately, Justice Powell's practical approach did not pro-
vide a theoretical framework for further definition of a minor's
right to privacy in the abortion context. Consequently, the ques-
tion of a state's power'to require parental notification before a
minor can obtain an abortion was left undecided, and the Court's
approach to defining a minor's privacy right in the abortion con-
text remains unresolved.
John R. McArthur
74. Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent,
60 VA. L. REV. 305, 332 (1974).
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